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MARATHON OIL CO. v. UNTED STATES.
THE RISING COSTS OF
DOMESTIC OIL PRODUCTION
M. Jean McDevitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA)1 was enacted
by Congress to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over submerged
lands on the continental shelf beyond three miles from the coastline.2
Pursuant to the OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to sell oil
and gas leases on outer continental shelf (OCS) lands through a competitive
bidding process.3 The Act was amended in 1978 to provide for the
"expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safe-
guards," of resources on the OCS "consistent with the maintenance of
competition and other national needs."4 Lessees must seek approvals from
various federal and state agencies before each stage of exploration, develop-
ment, andproduction.5 Considerable controversy can develop between the
lessee and the federal and state governments.
In one recent decision, Marathon Oil Co. v. United States,6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the government's
refusal to issue oil and gas exploration permits for the OCS to the lessee did
not constitute a material breach of a lease.7 As a result, lessees were not
entitled to restitution of over $156 million in up-front contract bonuses.8
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2001.
1. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356 (West 1986 & Supp.
1999).
2. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1331(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
3. See id. § 1337(a).
4. Id. § 1332(3).
5. See id. § 1340(c).
6. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 494 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-253).
7. The Federal Circuit reversed a decision from the United States Court of Federal
Claims, Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309 (1996). See Marathon Oil Co. v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 316 (1996).
8. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1333.
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In ruling that the government had not breached the lease, the court
upheld a means by which the federal government may withdraw federal
rights based on state objections without returning the federal consideration.9
Moreover, the legislative policy behind the OCSLA has been undermined
as OCS development under the current law will neitherbe "expeditious" nor
"orderly" as long as the federal government does not have to operate under
rules of fair dealing.
Viewing the OCSLA from an equitable perspective leads to the
conclusion that the process is flawed and should be changed. This Note
argues that lessees do not engage in a fair process when conflicting legisla-
tion exists and judicial determinations are unable to take this into account
in decision making. This Note suggests that the structure of the OCSLA
provides the answer in that more discussion should be centered upon the
lease sales rather than allowing state objections to effectively destroy an
exploration project post-sale.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Select Statutes Concerning Oil and Gas Leases
Passage of the OCSLA was part of a larger congressional action,
including the passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, to clarify the
federal and state jurisdictional problems.'0 Although the Submerged Lands
Act generally established state jurisdiction up to three geographical miles
from the coastline, including exclusive rights to the resources within, and
established federal jurisdiction beyond three miles, the Act failed to
comment on the resource rights within the federal OCS lands." Resolution
of these rights was a major goal for the subsequently passed OCSLA. In
addition to defining federal jurisdiction of the OCS as lands beyond the
three mile state jurisdiction, including the subsoil and seabed, 2 the OCSLA
provides for OCS resource management and leasing of tracts for oil, gas and
other mineral exploration and development, as administered by the Secre-
tary of the Interior."
Congress declared its policy in asserting authority over the resources of
the OCS:14 "[V]ital national resource[s]... held by the Federal Government
9. See id. at 1342 (Newman, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
10. See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 386-388 (1999).
11. See id. Based on historic reasoning, the boundaries of Florida, on the Gulf of
Mexico side, and Texas were extended three marine leagues, approximately 10.5 miles, from
their coastlines. See id. at 374.
12. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
13. See id. § 1334(a).
14. See id. § 1332.
Marathon Oil Co. v. United States
for the public... should be made available for expeditious and orderly
development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is
consistent with the maintenance ofcompetition and other national needs." 5
Congress recognized that OCS exploration, development, and production
would have a substantial impact on the coastal states. 6 Congress main-
tained that such states would be allowed assistance in protecting their
coastal zones from such an impact.' Moreover, such states would be
entitled to participate in the policy and planning decisions made by the
federal government in relation to exploration, development, and production
of OCS resources.'8 State participation would be subject to the national
interest.'9
OCSLA authorization for the Secretary of the Interiorto sell oil and gas
leases includes the formulation of a five-year oil and gas leasing program
that details a schedule of proposed lease sales, indicating the size, timing,
and location of leasing activity." The Secretary of the Interior prior to a
lease sale, must consider an intense study of industry interest and environ-
mental concerns.2' Once a lease sale program is finalized, competitive bids
are received and leases are issued to the successful bidders.' OCS leases
are issued by the Department of the Interior on standard, non-negotiable
lease forms.' OCS lessees may be required to pay large cash bonuses in
addition to periodic lease payments for the rights to submit plans of
exploration.24
15. Id. § 1332(3). "National needs" are generally thought to mean national security
interests. In light of Middle Eastern control ofoil production and numerous oil tanker spills,
national security should be a serious element in determining when and where oil production
is sound policy.
16. See id. § 1332(4).
17. See id. § 1332(4)(A).
18. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(4)(C).
19. See id.
20. Seeid. § 1344. The leasing schedule strives to recognize aproperbalance between
the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and
the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone. See id. § 1344(a).
21. See id. §§ 1344(c) &(f), 1346(a). The Secretarymustpublishacall forinformation
in the Federal Register regarding public interest and environmental concerns related to the
proposed sale. The Secretary must study the environmental concerns and draft an
environmental impact statement (EIS). After issuing the draft EIS, hearings are held and
comments taken, culminating in the approval or rejection of a final EIS. If the Secretary
decides to proceed with the sale, a proposed Notice of Sale is published in the Federal
Register. Following this entire process, the Secretary must formally consult with the
governors of affected states regarding the proposedNotice of Sale. The Secretary may then
decide whether to finally proceed with the sale. See id. §§ 1334(c) & (f), 1346(a),
1337(a)(8).
22. See id. § 1337(a).
23. See Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 316 (1996).
24. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a)(1). A successful bidder in effect gains few "rights" as
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At each stage of the oil and gas lease process-exploration, develop-
ment, and production-the lessee must submit plans to the Secretary of the
Interior 5 as well as any necessary permit applications.26 The Secretary must
either approve or request modifications of the plan within thirty days of its
submission. 7 If the lessee's exploration plans indicate effects to the land
or water use in the coastal zone of a state with a Coastal Zone Management
Act (CZMA) program, then the lessee must certify that the plan and permits
are consistent with the state's CZMA program.28 If the state does not
concur with the CZMA certification, then the Secretary of the Interior may
not approve such activities unless the Secretary of the Commerce overrides
the state's decision.29
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) 30 was enacted by
Congress to provide federal funding for states to develop and administer
coastal programs according to federal guidelines. 3' The CZMA established
a national policy to preserve, protect, develop, and restore or enhance the
coastal zone resources.32 Under the CZMA, any federal agency activity or
federally sponsored activity affecting the coastal zone must be consistent
with the state-created and federally approved management plan.33 Due to
a lessee. Essentially the lessee acquires only a priority position in submitting plans to
conduct exploration, development, and production; rejection of such plans results in no
further exploration. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 339 (1984).
25. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1).
26. The lessee is required to apply for a number of federal permits depending on the
proposed activities. An example relevant to the subject case is the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit obtained from the Environmental Protection
Agency. An NPDES permit is required if an activity includes discharge of pollutants into
the ocean. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 131 l(a), 1342(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
27. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1). Section 1340(c)(1) also provides that the Secretary
must disapprove any plan that would unavoidably cause serious harm to fish and aquatic life,
property, minerals (in areas leased or not leased), the national security or defense, or to the
marine, coastal, or human environment. See id. §§ 1340(c)(1), 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (listing
reasons for cancellation of a lease or permit). If the Secretary disapproves a plan under the
preceding reasons, he may cancel the lease and the lessee would be entitled to compensation.
See id. § 1340(c)(1).
28. See id. § 1340(c)(2). The section provides that, "[t]he Secretary shall not grant any
license or permit for any activity described in detail in an exploration plan and affecting any
land use or water use in the coastal zone of a State with a coastal zone management program
... unless the State concurs ..... Id.
29. See id. To override the state, the Secretary of the Commerce must find that the
lessee's activities are consistent with the CZMA or are necessary in the interest of national
security. See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (West 1985
& Supp. 1999).
30. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (West 1985 & Supp.
1999).
31. See KALO ET AL., supra note 10, at 202.
32. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452.
33. See id. §§ 1456(c)(l)-(2).
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the consistency requirement, no federal licenses or permits may be issued
until either the state has approved a plan of exploration or the Secretary has
overridden a state denial. 4
The Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA)35 was enacted by Congress as
part of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),36 a comprehensive oil spill
legislation package.37 The OBPA directly impacted the OCSLA by
expressly prohibiting the Secretary of the Interior from approving any plans
of exploration or otherwise permitting exploration, production, or develop-
ment ofthe OCS lands off ofNorth Carolinauntil at least October 1, 1991.38
Congress repealed the OBPA in 1996. 39
The mandates of the preceding legislation require that the federal and
state governments and private lessees work together; however, the goals of
the legislation may be at cross-purpose with the goals of the interested
parties, resulting in significant litigation.
B. Court Decisions Involving OCSLA Determinations
A number of federal cases have been litigated concerning various
provisions of the OCSLA relevant to the subject case. In Secretary of the
34. See id. § 1456(c)(3)(B). The CZMA expressly establishes the procedure for
approval of the plans of exploration and permits that are required under the OCSLA for oil
and gas leases. The cross-reference between the two statutes indicates that Congress
intended significant coordination and cooperation between state and federal agencies
regarding the development of OCS oil and gas tracts. See id. § 1456(c)(B)(iii); supra text
accompanying note 29.
35. Outer Banks Protection Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2753 (1994) (repealed 1996).
36. Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C.A. §§2701-2761 (West. Supp. 1999).
37. The OBPA was passed in large part due to the successful legislative efforts of
North Carolina Congressman Walter Jones. Enactment of the OBPA was in direct response
to oil and gas lease tracts off of the North Carolina coast. See Conoco Inc. v. United States,
35 Fed. Cl. 309, 318 (1996).
38. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2753(c)(1) (repealed 1996). The prohibitions as stated by
Congress are as follows:
The Secretary of the Interior shall not-
(A) conduct a lease sale;
(B) issue any new leases;
(C) approve any exploration plan;
(D) approve any development and production plan;
(E) approve any application for permit to drill; or
(F) permit any drilling, for oil or gas under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
on any lands of the Outer Continental Shelf offshore North Carolina.
Id. In addition to the moratorium on exploration and development, the OBPA also created
the Environmental Sciences Review Panel to study the impact of proposed North Carolina
OCS development. See id. § 2753(c)(3)(A) (repealed 1996).
39. See id. § 2753 (repealed 1996).
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Interior v. California,40 the Secretary appealed a lower court decision to
enjoin the Secretary from proceeding with oil and gas lease sales off of the
coast of California.4' The plaintiffs argued that the sales were activities
directly affecting the coastal zone thereby requiring a consistency certifica-
tion under the CZMA.42 In reversing the injunction, the Supreme Court
held in part that the purchase of a lease entails no right to proceed with full
exploration, development, or production; the lessee acquires only a priority
over other interested parties in submitting plans to conduct those activities
on the leased tract.43 Moreover, the Court observed that states with feder-
ally approved CZMA programs have considerable authority to veto
exploration, production, and development plans that are inconsistent with
the state's program."
In Sun Oil Co. v. United States,45 the plaintiffs sought damages after
claiming that the delay of the Secretary of the Interior in approving a permit
to install a drilling platform constituted a breach of the lease contract.46 The
Secretary's consideration of the application followed an oil blowout from
a lease tract operated by a third party.47 All drilling and production
40. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
41. See id. at 320.
42. See id. at 319. California argued that a lease sale sets in motion a chain of events
that culminates in oil and gas development, directly affecting the coastal zone. See id.
43. See id. at 337. The Court found a significant difference between the lease sale and
actual exploration, development, and production of the tract. In essence, the Court stated
that stricter requirements are in effect later in the development process, which is when
adverse environmental effects are most likely to occur. See id. at 341.
44. See id. The Court's statements are relevant because they identify the limited
"property" rights that the lessee's acquire upon purchase of an oil and gas lease. A lease
issued under the OCSLA does not convey title in the land, nor does it convey an unencum-
bered estate in the oil and gas. See Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.
1975). Although an oil and gas lease does convey interests enforceable against the
government, such interests lack many of the characteristics of private property. Because the
resources of the OCS belong to all people of the nation, Congress has established safeguards
to ensure that the benefits of exploitation are extended to all, not just the private lease
holder. See id. As a result of both statutory safeguards and other regulations, "successful"
lessees have significant barriers to overcome before actual production may begin and lessees
are not guaranteed that they will ever realize production on their tracts.
45. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
46. See id. at 793. Plaintiff's breach of lease theory is based on the general proposition
that, "neither party to the contract will do anything to prevent performance thereof by the
other party or that will hinder or delay him in its performance." Id. at 801 (quoting Wah
Chang Corp. v. United States, 282 F.2d 728, 733 (Ct. CI. 1960)).
47. See Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d at 797. The blowout occurred at a
platform operated by Union Oil Company in California's Santa Barbara Channel. The
massive oil spill polluted the Channel and adjacent coastline, killing birds, fish and other
marine organisms, damaged beaches and shore front property and restricted fishing and
recreational activities in the Santa Barbara area. See id.
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operations on federal lease tracts in that area were temporarily suspended.48
As a result of the delay, the plaintiffs suspended the construction of their
platform.49 The court found that the Secretary's delay in permit approval
was irrelevant because it was not the primary cause of delay; rather, the
plaintiff's own decision to halt construction of the platform was the
immediate cause.5
Ill. MARATHON OIL CO. V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
The questions presented in Marathon Oil Co. v. United States5'
concentrate on the denial by the Secretary of the Interior of the permits
necessary for Marathon to engage in oil exploration, and the effect of the
Outer Banks Protection Act, which was enacted subsequent to the parties
entering the lease contract.5 2 The leases were purchased in 1981 by
Marathon Oil Company, Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast,
Inc., and Amerada Hess Corporation. 3 Each company purchased one-third
undivided interests in five OCS lease tracts off the coast of North Carolina;
each paid more than $78 million to the Government in up-front cash
bonuses.' The lessees joined into a single entity known as the Manteo
Unit.55
The Manteo Unit drafted a plan of exploration (POE) proposing to drill
one exploratory well about forty-five miles east of Cape Hatteras.56
Following objections to the POE by the state of North Carolina in 1989, the
State, the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Manteo Unit entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding that required a special environmental
48. See Id. The blowout resulted in a series of investigations, reviews of existing
procedures, and reconsiderations of the federal leasing program in that area. The Interior
Department's primary concern following the incident was ensuring that future operations
would not result in similar environmental disasters. See id.
49. See id. at 799.
50. See id. at 807. In addition, the court emphasized the obligations the Secretary faced
in response to the oil spill. The Secretary was required to proceed with extreme care in
approving the installation of another drilling platform in the Santa Barbara Channel. The
Secretary's deliberately cautious approval was reasonable. See id. at 808.
51. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 t.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 494 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-253).
52. See id. at 1333.
53. See id. at 1334.
54. See id. In addition to the up-front cash bonuses, each company paid approximately
$264,000 in annual rentals during the ten-year primary term. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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review before the Secretary would act on the POE.57 The environmental
review determined that the POE would not result in any significant environ-
mental impacts and the DOI considered the POE to be "approvable in all
respects. 58 However, in 1990, North Carolina also objected to the CZMA
certification of the Manteo Unit's application to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit. 9
Before any further action was taken on the POE or requested permits,
Congress passed the OBPA, placing a temporary moratorium on exploration
and development of the North Carolina OCS. 6° Pursuant to the OBPA, the
DOI suspended all leases offshore of North Carolina, terminating both the
operations and the obligation to pay rental fees on the leases.6 ' Despite the
legislation, the Manteo Unit submitted its final POE to drill the exploratory
well.6 ' North Carolina formally objected to the Manteo Unit's certification
that the POE would comply with the state's CZMA program. 3 The Manteo
Unit appealed North Carolina's CZMA objections to the Secretary of
Commerce. 64 The Secretary of Commerce found that the POE and the
discharge of wastes under the NPDES permit were neither consistent with
North Carolina's CZMA program nor of such interest to national security
that an override was clearly necessary.65 In October of 1992, Marathon Oil
Company and Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc.
("Marathon"), intervened as third party plaintiffs in a breach of contract
action between the United States and Conoco Inc.6 over OCS leases off the
coasts of Alaska, Florida, and North Carolina. 7
57. See id. at 1334.
58. Id. at 1335.
59. See id. The NPDES permit was required because the POE included planned
discharge of wastes into the ocean. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1311 (a), 1342(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999). Under the CZMA, state concurrence of the
NPDES permit is required before it may be granted. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West
1985 & Supp. 1999).
60. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1335; 33 U.S.C.A. § 2753(c)(1);
supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
61. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1335.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 314-15 (1996).
67. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1336. All the OCS lessees
reached settlements with the government, however, Marathon Oil Company and Mobil Oil
Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc. reserved the right to all claims regarding the
OBPA's effect on the OCS leases off the North Carolina coast. See id.
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B. Court of Federal Claims Ruling
The United.States Court of Federal Claims granted Marathon's cross-
motion for partial summary judgment on their claim of breach of contract.68
Marathon was subsequently awarded restitution of the up-front cash
bonuses amounting to over $156 million.69 The court made a number of
findings.70 First, the court found that the OBPA should not have applied to
the contract because it was not considered as a basis of the bargain.7 The
lease provided that it would be subject to all other applicable statutes and
regulations including all subsequent regulations issued pursuant to the
OCSLA statute. 72 No mention of future statutes was made.73 Neither of the
parties had anticipated the OBPA or similar legislation at the making of the
contract.74 Second, the court found that the Secretary had a duty under the
terms of the contract to act on the lessee's POE within thirty days of
submission.5 Because the OBPA legislatively barred the Secretary from
acting on the POE, the government had to be in breach of the contract.76
Finally, in response to the government's argument that the Secretary had
properly suspended the contract, thereby eliminating all obligations for both
parties, the court found that the Secretary had no right to suspend the
contract pursuant to the OBPA.77
C. On Appeal
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that although the leases were not subject to the OBPA, the
government's decision not to approve the exploration of the OCS site did
68. See Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 337. The court denied defendant's
motions for summary judgment. See id.
69. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1333.
70. See Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 322-3 1.
71. See id. at 322-23.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 323. The court found that the OBPA evaded the spirit of the bargain by
compelling interference with and failure to cooperate with the parties' performance. See id.
at 324.
75. See id. at 327.
76. See id. at 328.
77. See id. at 330; 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1); supra text accompanying note 27. The
suspension notice that the government sent to the lessees stated that the suspension was
necessary to comply with the OBPA; the government later claimed that the suspension was
necessary to conduct additional environmental studies. See Conoco Inc. v. United States,
35 Fed. Cl. at 329. The court viewed this as an improper attempt to justify the suspension
retroactively. See id.
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not constitute a material breach of the lease.7" The court held that neither
party had breached the lease and Marathon was not entitled to a return of its
up-front cash bonuses.79 The court summarily dismissed the importance of
the OBPA by concurring with the lower court that the terms of the lease did
not provide for the application of subsequently enacted legislation. 0 The
court instead focused on Marathon's obligations under the contract.8 '
The court found that the importance of the OBPA was essentially moot
because Marathon had failed to meets its obligations in terms of satisfying
North Carolina's regulations and certifications." Marathon had been unable
to provide the necessary state concurrence to its certification of CZMA
compliance.83 Satisfaction of applicable statutes and regulations was a
prerequisite to obtaining the necessary permits and licenses.' As long as
Marathon failed to meet the certification requirements, the Secretary of the
Interior was not able to issue the permits, regardless of the applicability of
the OBPA.8 5
Marathon argued that the Secretary of Commerce had declined to
override North Carolina's CZMA objections based on the enactment of the
OBPA.16 The court refused to consider that issue because it was not before
the court on appeal.87 Marathon also argued that, in the event that the lease
was subject to state CZMA consistency objections, the Government should
have canceled the lease and provided restitution.8 The court found no basis
for such compensation in the OCSLA. 9 The court concluded that Marathon
78. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
court's duty was to determine whether the lower court's judgment was correct as a matter
of law.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1337.
81. See id. at 1337-39.
82. See id. at 1338.
83. See id. The court identified North Carolina's objection as the lessee's "failure to
provide data and information necessary to allow the State to conduct a proper consistency
review of the proposal on its merits." Id. at 1339. The court noted that the objection to the
POE CZMA consistency certification was also for inadequate information. See id. at 1339.
84. See id.; Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312,341 (1984); supra text
accompanying note 44.
85. See Marathon Oil v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1339; 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(2);
supra text accompanying note 28.
86. See Marathon Oil v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1339.
87. See id. Marathon filed an action challenging the Secretary of Commerce's
decision. See Mobil Oil Exploration v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 1996). The
district court remanded back to the Secretary of Commerce to determine whether certain
studies performed by the Department of the Interior should have been allowed to enter the
administrative record after it was closed but prior to his decision. See id. at 3.
88. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1339.
89. See id. The OCSLA's cancellation provisions identify harm to the marine, coastal,
or human environment as grounds for cancellation and subsequent compensation. See 43
Marathon Oil Co. v. United States
had risked a large amount of up-front money on a lease tract without
knowing its value.90 The court characterized Marathon's financial loss as
no different in principle than if weather conditions, equipment failures, or
financial problems had contributed to its inability to explore the tract.9 1 The
court found that Marathon's inability to explore the tract was not attribut-
able to the government and, therefore, Marathon was not entitled to any
refund of the consideration paid for the lease.92
IV. DISCUSSION
The holding of the court in Marathon Oil is a proper interpretation of
the facts and adheres to the plain language of the OCSLA. The holding
recognizes that the OBPA and its mandated moratorium should not have
effectuated a result on the government's contract with Marathon's POE.93
In holding that the Secretary satisfied his obligations under the contract and
the OCSLA, and that Marathon's inability to get consistency certification
was the true deficiency, the court failed to recognize the interplay between
the OCSLA and the CZMA and ignored the legislative intent of the
OCSLA. The court's holding allows a violation of the legislative intent of
the OCSLA and its entire leasing program.
The OCSLA's congressional policy recognizes the OCS as a "vital
resource" held for the public that should be made available for "expeditious
and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner
which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national
needs." 94 As a result of North Carolina's objections, this resource was not
developed under the contracted-for lease. North Carolina's objections are
understandable; its perspective is possibly shared by every other state as
U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(a)(2), 1340(c)(1). The court's finding that it was Marathon's own failure
in complying with its obligations eliminates applicability of the OCSLA cancellation.
provisions.
90. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d at 1340.
91. See id.
92. See id. The dissenting opinion found Marathon's loss to be fully attributable to the
government. See id. at 1341. The dissent characterized the issue as a "change of
government policy after the exploration rights had been sold and paid for." Id. Stating that
the Government had violated its obligation by failing to timely and fairly consider the POE,
the dissent perceived the issue as a lack of fair dealing and found that the Government had
prohibited performance of the contract. See id.; supra text accompanying note 74.
93. In actuality, however, the OBPA was at least partly responsible for Marathon's
inability to secure the necessary permits. The Department of the Interior had already
indicated its tendency toward approving the POE. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States,
177 F.3d at 1335; supra text accompanying note 58.
94. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999); supra text accompanying note
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well. The potential negative effects of an oil drilling platform are conceiv-
able for any coastal state.95 Despite these objections, the OCS resources
still belong to the national public and development is a necessary reality of
that ownership.
State governments should be engaged in the process of OCS resource
development. However, this engagement should not be merely in the form
of a veto power. Instead, state and federal governments and lessees should
be working together to encourage the use of better equipment and to
improve the technology in both resource development and pollution
containment and clean up. It would be far more productive to encourage
businesses to increase technology to make oil extraction cleaner and safer
rather than preventing them from developing domestic resources.
The interplay of the CZMA and OCSLA requires that the parties work
together in order to have a successful leasing program. In studying the facts
of this case, it seems appropriate to consider where the communication
broke down. Did Marathon simply think it could ignore the consistency
requirement? Or were North Carolina's objections not explicitly clear? It
seems unimaginable that Marathon would have gambled a vast sum of
money and a huge production opportunity on the incompleteness of a few
documents.
The role of the Secretary of the Interior should be carefully scrutinized
as well. The Secretary is obligated to invite and consider studies and hear
from various interests, including state governments, prior to approving a
lease sale program.96 The Secretary of the Interior should be encouraged to
consider a state's objections more seriously at the beginning of the lease
sale program design. The primary parties should be engaged in a collective
agreement that ignores no interest but also balances the benefits of the OCS
resources. State objections that are consistently present throughout the
lease-sale program should be analyzed and decisive action to either halt the
lease sales or continue with exploration should be made before lessees are
engaged.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that as the stages of
lease exploration, development, and production advance, the scrutiny of
environmental safety is heightened. 97 Environmental safeguards require
that exploration, production, and development be well controlled. In the
present case, however, concrete environmental issues were not the
95. However, "not in my backyard" is never a good answer, be it for toxic waste dumps
or oil platforms.
96. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c)(1); supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
97. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984); supra text
accompanying notes 40-44.
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problem.98 Rather, the conflicting interests of the fishing, tourism, and oil
industries were at issue.99
A marked difference exists between the suspension in the present case
and suspensions that have occurred in the past.l ° Numerous cases have
been litigated concerning lease rights when companies have been prevented
from pursuing their exploration, production, and development because of
an environmental disaster.'' For example, as a result of the 1969 oil
blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel off the California coast, Congress
was certainly justified in exercising its police powers by suspending
operations. In the present case, however, no specific risk of environmental
harm existed, and the POE and permit applications were submitted. The
environmental status of the area had not changed from the time when the
lease sale program was developed and when Marathon attempted to explore
the tract. Despite Marathon's inability to obtain North Carolina's CZMA
consistency certification, the company did not violate any rules.0 2 With the
exception of the Santa Barbara incident, all major domestic oil spills have
occurred as a result of tanker accidents.0 3 The environmental risks associ-
ated with OCS development are substantially less than the risks with oil
tanker passage."
The business and monetary risks involved with OCS development,
however, are substantial. Marathon Oil is indicative of the huge risk that
companies take when investing in domestic oil production. Marathon paid
large cash bonuses on the expectation that the lease tracts contained
substantial oil reserves and could be made productive. Although a federal
buyback program is inherently impossible because of the term of years of
lease sales and the federal finance structure, alternative bidding systems
exist that would greatly improve the OCSLA leasing program. 5 Under an
alternative bidding system, the lessee would be able to put down a smaller
98. Numerous environmental reviews were carried out by the Secretary of the Interior,
Marathon, and independent studies at the request ofNorth Carolina. All of the reviews came
back favorably as to proceeding with the exploration. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United
States, 177 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (U.S. Nov 15, 1999)
(No. 99-253); supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
99. The ever-present realm ofpolitics was also at issue in the present case. See Conoco
Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 318 (1996).
100. See Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 592 F.2d 786, 797 (Ct. Cl. 1978); supra text
accompanying notes 45-50.
101. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Union Oil Co.
v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
103. See KALO ETAL., supra note 10, at 386.
104. See id.
105. See James C. Cox et al., OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Perfor-
mance ofAlternative Bidding Institutions, 2 Sup. CT. EcoN. REv. 43, 51-54 (1983).
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cash payment, so there would be less at risk in the event of a lease suspen-
sion or termination without compensation." 6 Alternative bidding systems
would lessen the impact of cancellation by decreasing the bonus amounts
paid during the bidding process and increasing the rental payments as the
lease tract becomes productive.'07
Because of fiscal benefits, the federal government is unable to abstain
from involvement in OCS oil and gas development. Financial gains from
drilling, lease sales, royalties, bonuses, and rents constitute the third largest
non-tax source of revenue for the federal government.' 8 OCS litigation
results in additional financial pressure as timely litigation results in little
more than mere delays and some modification of OCS plans. As in the
present cases, Congress may withdraw highly sensitive areas from lease
plans but this also results in a lengthy and expensive litigation process.
V. CONCLUSION
In upholding the contract between Marathon and the Government, the
Marathon Oil holding illustrates the adverse positions held by the federal
and state governments and OCSLA lessees. This Note agrees that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adhered to the plain
language of the OCSLA and the contract; however, legislative policy and
the leasing program have suffered as a result. The lease sale program
should be restructured to provide for more initial discussion prior to lease
sales, and the lessees should not be required to put such vast sums of money
into up-front cash bonuses. The leasing program should further consider
and use alternative bidding systems as a means of encouraging domestic oil
production while maintaining environmental safeguards.
Relief may exist for Marathon Oil Company and other lessees similarly
situated. The United States Supreme Court recently granted the petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.109
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See KALO ETAL., supra note 10, at 386.
109. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S.Ct. 494 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-253).
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